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Abstract
This paper studies the e¤ect on the risk of female victimization of the employ-
ment statuses of both partners, conditional on income and a set of sociodemo-
graphic characteristics. Using cross-sectional data from the Violence Against
Women (VAW) surveys for Spain in 1999, 2002, and 2006, we address the po-
tential endogeneity of employment and income variables using a multivariate
probit model. We exploit geographical-level information on employment and
unemployment rates by gender and age, and on household income, to identify
the parameters of the model. Our estimation results, for which proper account
of the endogeneity problem proves critical, show that male partner employment
plays a major role in the risk of physical violence, while female employment only
lowers the risk of violence when her partner is employed too. The lowest risk of
physical abuse appears for more egalitarian couples in which both partners are
employed.
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1 Introduction
Violence against women perpetrated by their intimate partners is an issue of social and
political concern. It is rooted in social inequalities between men and women and a form
of gender-based discrimination (Garcia-Moreno et al, 2005). Despite the increased
attention paid to it, the problem is still present in many countries. According to
the Special Eurobarometer on Domestic Violence against Women from the European
Commission (2010), one European woman in four experiences domestic violence at
some point in her life, and between 6-10% of women su¤er domestic violence in a
given year. It is also a widespread problem in the U.S. where, according to OECD
(2013), 5:9% of women reported having experienced domestic violence during 2010
and 35:6% in their lifetime.
This problem imposes a signicant economic burden on society as a whole, in
the form of health care costs, policing and legal costs, or declines in productivity,
among others. It can also have harmful consequences for children who witness it in
terms of their emotional, cognitive, and behavioral development. Moreover, it is well-
documented that domestic violence passes through the generations, in that children
who are exposed to violence in their families of origin are more likely to become
involved in violent relationships as adults. Therefore, we should consider not only the
short term consequences of the domestic violence, but also its long-lasting e¤ects.
One potential way advocated to prevent abuse is to improve the outside oppor-
tunities of the woman so as to increase her bargaining power within the household.
The pioneering study of Gelles (1976) nds a negative relationship between female
resources and intimate-partner violence. However, the existing empirical evidence on
this relationship is mixed. The empirical studies di¤er in the level of disaggregation of
the data, the geographical scope of the analysis, the subpopulation under study and,
very specially, in the methodological approach, particularly whether endogeneity of
both partnersresources is acknowledged or not.
In this paper, we assess the separate and interacted e¤ects of both partnersemploy-
ment statuses on the risk of intimate-partner violence (IPV), conditional on household
income and a set of sociodemographic characteristics. Using cross-sectional data from
the Violence Against Women (VAW) surveys for Spain in the years 1999, 2002, and
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2006, we consider separately binary indicators for two types of intimate-partner abuse,
physical and non-physical. The qualitatively di¤erent forms of IPV has been acknowl-
edged by previous studies, which may indicate distinctive correlates and distinctive
behaviors for the di¤erent types of violence (see MacMillan and Gartner, 1999).
The challenge of identifying the causal e¤ect of employment and income indica-
tors on the risk of IPV originates from the potential endogeneity of these variables.
Their discrete nature makes two-stage or instrumental variable methods inappropriate.
Thus, we consider a multivariate probit model in which we specify three additional
equations for the employment indicators of the woman and her partner, as well as
for household income. We rely on the jointly normal distributional assumption and,
additionally, exploit exclusion restrictions to identify the parameters of the model. In
particular, we exploit exogenous geographical information on the employment and un-
employment rates by gender and by age, and on household income. To ascertain the
role of the endogeneity in the estimation results, we also estimate univariate probit
models for the probability of IPV, which assume exogeneity of the employment and
income variables.
If employment were just an indicator of availability to economic resources within the
household, the main mechanism linking lack of employment and violence should be the
stress derived from the lack of resources within the household. Thus, one would expect
that employment statuses of the partners should have little or at most a limited e¤ect
on domestic violence, once other measures of economic resources, such as income, are
accounted for. Moreover, if in addition to the absolute amount of resources, the relative
contribution of each partner a¤ects their corresponding bargaining power, then we
should expect woman employment and partner employment to have di¤erential roles
in the incidence of intimate-partner violence. However, male employment might also
have a symbolicrole and entail more than just economic resources. As Macmillan
and Gartner (1999) point out, notions of masculinity remain strongly tied to beliefs
about being a good provider and breadwinner. From this perspective, the e¤ect of
women employment would be di¤erent depending on her partners employment status.
Equally, a strong e¤ect of mens employment status as opposed to womens could also
reveal the symbolic consideration of mens employment.
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Our estimation results show that reckoning endogeneity has critical consequences
on the estimation of the causal e¤ects of employment and income on both types of
IPV. The main estimation results, which account for endogeneity, can be summarized
as follows. There is an asymmetry in the role of employment statuses of the partners
in the risk of physical IPV, with male employment playing the major role, and female
employment only reducing physical IPV provided that her partner is employed too.
The risk of physical violence is signicantly lower when the male partner is employed,
ranging from 2.9 to 1.9 percentage points less depending on whether the woman is
employed or not, respectively. Female employment reduces the probability of physical
violence by 2.5 percentage points, provided that her partner is employed too. Regard-
ing non-physical IPV, the risk is signicantly reduced by 4.9 percentage points for
employed woman whose partners are employed too, while the reduction for employed
partners when women are employed too amounts to 2.7 percentage points. Consider-
ing that the respective sample rates of physical and non-physical IPV are 3.9% and
8.2%, the marginal e¤ects of employment statuses are quantitatively relevant.
Our results agree with the interpretation that equal couples, in which both partners
are employed, tend to have the lowest risk of physical violence. On the contrary, the
highest risk arose for couples in which the male partner is not employed, in accordance
with the instrumental use of violence by abusing partners predicted by backlash theo-
ries: when the male partner feels challenged by a relative improvement in the womans
position within the household, he inicts violence in order to assert his dominant posi-
tion. Finally, the household income indicator is not signicant, so that the importance
of the labor market statuses of the partners matters beyond economic considerations
in the risk of partner abuse.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we provide an overview
of previous theoretical and empirical contributions about intimate-partner violence.
In section 3 we describe the sources of the data used in the analysis and provide a
descriptive analysis of the main data. In section 4 we discuss the methodological
appproach, and present the estimation results in section 5. Section 6 summarizes the
main ndings and concludes.
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2 Previous research on intimate partner violence
Family violence has originally being a topic of study in the elds of criminology and
sociology, for which intimate-partner violence serves two purposes. The rst is expres-
sive, to the extent that some men derive direct utility from the violence. The second
purpose of violence is instrumental, thus increasing partners utility indirectly through
the control of female behavior (Gelles, 1974). The major issue of concern has been
the relationship between the socio-economic situation and the risk of spousal violence.
According to the sociological absolute resource theory (Gelles, 1974), diminished
household resources lead to conict that can culminate in female victimization. Thus,
violence might be particularly prevalent in households in which the indicators of eco-
nomic resources point to a di¢ cult situation, as for instance low income households,
low educated households, or households in which both partners are unemployed.
The economic research in family violence is relatively recent and scant. The main
theoretical contributions consists of game-theoretical approaches which challenge the
cooperative, altruistic models set up by Becker (1965, 1973). Tauchen, Witte and
Long (1991) and Farmer and Tiefenthaler (1997) consider non-cooperative game mod-
els with partnersutilities being functions of their consumption levels and the violence
exerted by the male partner, which plays both an expressive and an instrumental role.
Improving economic opportunities for the woman outside the relationship might in-
crease the womans reservation utility. Among such economic opportunities, we should
mention improved education, income and labor market participation, but also the odds
of a generous divorce settlement and the quality of help services for battered women
(Farmer and Tiefenthaler, 1996). It is generally assumed that the female reservation
utility is binding and the woman receives net income transfers from her partner, which
would mostly correspond to situations in which relative income is dominated by men.
Under such case, according with Tauchen et al (1991), changes in male and female
income have the opposite e¤ects on violence, which only plays an expressive purpose.
Instrumental use of violence would be discarded to the extent that women have the
possibility of ending the relationship (Aizer, 2010). An increase in male income al-
lows him to exert more violence, while an increase in female income forces her partner
to reduce violence in order to assure her reservation utility. Such situation provides
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support to fostering women economic empowerment as a way to reduce the risk of
abuse.
Notwithstanding, Tauchen et al (1991) remark that when the female reservation
utility is not binding, violence exerted by the male partner can also have an instru-
mental purpose. In this case, violence is not necessarily decreasing with income if the
male marginal utility of violence increases when the woman is better o¤, so that an
income increase might lead to an increase in violence. In particular, when the female
reservation utility is not binding and there are not income transfers between partners
(so that each partner income increase is devoted to the own partners consumption),
whereas an increase in male income would just increase male consumption and de-
crease violence, an increase in female income might increase female consumption and
increase violence.1 The instrumental use of violence by male partners is on the basis of
the sociological theory of male backlash(Hornung, McCullough and Sugimoto, 1981;
Macmillan and Gartner, 1999), which predicts that an improvement in the economic
situation of women might increase the risk of abuse. Exercise of violence emerges as
a result of imbalance in access to resources within the household. Male partners can
perceive women improvement in outside opportunities as a threat, to which they might
respond violently to assert their dominance in the relationship. On the other hand,
according to the extractive theory the male might exercise violence on a woman
with more economic resources to extract a monetary transfer, thus weakening her
bargaining position.
The theoretical predictions establishing a decreasing e¤ect of woman economic
opportunities on the incidence of violence are conrmed by many empirical studies
(Aizer, 2010; Farmer and Tiefenthaler, 1997, Tauchen et al, 1991). However, several
studies, particularly for patriarchal cultures where divorce is hardly an option for
women, a relative increase in female income may increase the risk of victimization, as
it challenges the socially prescribed male dominance, triggering male backlash (Luke
and Munshi, 2011).
Female participation in the labor market is largely advocated as an e¤ective way
1If there are transfers beteween partners and the male marginal utility of violence is increasing
with female consumption, changes in income have the same sign irrespective of whether it is males
or females income, but the e¤ect of an income increase on violence can be positive, if the income
e¤ect were strong enough to allow a greater female consumption.
5
to improve her bargaining power within the household. There are numerous empirical
studies that have analyzed the e¤ect of female employment status on the incidence
of violence, with mixed results. One of the rst studies is Gelles (1976), who nd
a negative relationship. Other studies, such as DeMaris et al. (2003), nd greater
violence towards women who are employed. Interestingly, Kaukinen (2004) nds that
the association between a womans employment and her risk of abuse depends on the
employment status of her partner, abuse being more likely if she is employed while her
partner is not.
But the main shortcoming of these papers, and others that followed, is that they
do not account for the potential endogeneity of labor market status.2 To overcome this
problem, some authors have estimated structural models (Bowlus and Seitz., 2006) or
used panel data techniques (Tauchen et al., 1991) to control reverse causality and cor-
related time invariant unobserved heterogeneity. Other authors have used instrumental
variables techniques, such as Villarreal (2007), who uses the level of control exercised
by her partner; Chin (2012) who uses the exogenous variation in rural womens work-
ing status driven by rainfall shocks and the rice-wheat dichotomy; and Bhattacharyya,
Bedi and Chhachhi (2011), who assume that children and family type a¤ect female
participation but not violence.
Another strand of the literature focuses on the signalling role of local unemployment
rates by gender and its e¤ect in the incidence of partners abuse. Anderberg, Rainer,
Wadsworth and Wilson (2015) and Tur-Prats (2015) nd that male unemployment
rate has a negative e¤ect on abuse, while the e¤ect of the female unemployment rate
is negative. However, they do not consider the e¤ect of the own employment status
of the partners on the risk of abuse. Aizer (2010) considers potential, and not actual
wages, to estimate the causal e¤ect of the gender wage gap on the risk of abuse by
exploiting exogenous changes in the demand for labor in female dominated industries
relative to male dominated ones. Specically, she uses a measure of the gender wage
gap at the municipality level, which reects gender-specic labor demand but not
underlying worker characteristics potentially correlated with domestic violence.
Another line of theoretical research has considered the intergenerational trans-
2See, for instance, Strube and Barbour (1983), or Yllo and Strauss (1981).
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mission of domestic violence within families. Pollak (2004) develops a model with
expressive violence in which both men and women are heterogeneous in their cor-
responding probabilities of committing and su¤ering abuse, where such probabilities
depend on whether each of them were raised in violent homes. The model recognizes
the importance of the marriage market and divorce in the level of domestic violence,
showing that factors that reduce the incidence of abuse in the short run might have
strong e¤ects in the long run because of its impact in intergenerational transmission.
3 Data and descriptive evidence
Our primary source of data consist of the 1999, 2002 and 2006 cross-sectional surveys
on Violence Against Women (VAW) for Spain.3 These surveys were fostered by the
First National Response Programme against Domestic Violence4, established in 1998,
which led to subsequent legislative proposals that gave rise in 2004 to the rst con-
stitutional law against gender-based violence. This bill not only established harsher
penalties for o¤enders, but also nance public help services and shelters for battered
women, promoted training programmes for health professionals and judges, and cam-
paigns in public education institutions and the media to raise awareness about violence
against women. After its approval, both the number of legal actions, the number of
emergency calls, and the number of women a¢ liated to the special phone service for
victims of abuse has increased (see Table 1). However, this increasing trend has at-
tened in the aftermath of the recession, following a funding reduction in help resources
for victimized women.
The VAW surveys form broad and representative samples, both at the national and
at the regional level, of women living in Spain for each corresponding year. The surveys
were conducted by phone to adult women (at least 18 years old). The original dataset
contains 69; 627 observations. In order to conduct our analysis, we have imposed the
following selection criteria. We have restricted the sample to women younger than
65 years old, cohabiting with her partner and not enrolled in school. Moreover, we
3Data for 2011 are also available. However, we have excluded them, given that there are important
methodological di¤erences, which entail the survey design and the way in which the survey was
conducted.
4Primer Plan de Acción contra la Violencia Doméstica.
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have removed those women reporting more than two relationships. Finally, we have
discarded all respondents with missing covariate information. The sample size is thus
reduced to 32; 410 observations. The VAW surveys include information on domestic
violence, as well as sociodemographic characteristics for the woman and her partner.
The survey undertakes the widely accepted methods to measure exposures to vio-
lence by an intimate partner. Gold standard methods to estimate the prevalence of any
form of violence are obtained by asking respondents direct questions about their expe-
rience of specic acts of violence over a dened period of time, rather than using more
generic questions about whether the respondent has been abusedor has experienced
domestic violenceor rapeor sexual abuse, which tends to yield less disclosure
(World Health Organization, 2013). The information about domestic violence experi-
enced by women is gathered by means of a multiple choice question module addressed
to all women except for those currently either living alone or without a partner. This
module presents a list of 26 behaviors that constitute domestic abuse. Women are
asked to indicate which, among such behaviors, they have experienced lately, and if
so, how often (usually, sometimes, rarely), and by whom (partner, di¤erent relatives
living at home, other people living at home). We consider, following Anderberg et al.
(2015), those behaviors that entail serious abuse by the partner, which, in the Spanish
VAW survey, are circumscribed to 13 out of the 26 listed behaviors (see Tur-Prats,
2014). We then construct two binary indicators of IPV (Intimate Partner Violence),
Physical and Non-Physical, which takes on value one if the respondent attributed her
partner to behave usuallyor sometimesto the categories corresponding to phys-
ical and non-physical abuse, respectively.5 Table 2 presents the list of behaviors from
which we have constructed our IPV indicators. For descriptive purposes and to allow
the comparison with previous studies, particularly for Spain, we have also reported
the IPV indicator that considers either physical or non-physical serious abuse.
In Table 3 we report the IPV incidence for the three years we have considered.
5The measures under this methodology, however, cannot tell anything about the intensity of the
abuse. In particular, the fact that among two women for which the IPV indicator takes on value one
but the rst woman declares to have experienced a higher number of listed behaviors than the second
one does not imply that the rst woman faces a more serious situation of abuse. The characteristics
of the available IPV information precludes the use of principal components as an alternative to build
a synthetic measure of IPV, as the values of such synthetic variable could be hardly interpreted in
terms of more or less serious abuse.
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About 11:7% of women reported to have experienced some situation of serious abuse.
When breaking down into physical and non-physical abuse, we nd that about 5% of
women reported physical abuse, while 9:3% reported serious non-physical abuse. The
incidence has signicantly decreased over time, the rates of physical and non-physical
abuse ranging from 6:4% and 10:3% in 1999 to 3:9% and 8:2% in 2006, about one year
after the constitutional law against gender-based violence was passed by the Spanish
Parliament.
In Table 4 we break down the IPV incidence by region. The incidence of any type
of IPV ranges from 8:8% to 14:4%, and the di¤erences across regions are statistically
signicant. It is interesting to mention that most Southern regions, whose average per
capita income is clearly below the national average (Andalucia, Castilla-La Mancha,
Extremadura, and the African autonomous cities of Ceuta and Melilla) exhibit the
highest incidence of IPV, quite above the average value at the national level.
The main summary statistics by IPV status are reported in Table 5. These sta-
tistics point out that women, partner and household characteristics di¤er depending
on the presence of abuse, where the stronger di¤erences appear for physical abuse.
Women experiencing abuse are signicantly older and exhibit substantially lower lev-
els of education than women who are not abused. Equally, the partners of women
experiencing abuse tend to be signicantly older and with signicantly lower levels
of education than those of women who are not abused. Particularly, many abused
women have not even completed primary studies, while much fewer women with a col-
lege degree have experienced abuse. This same pattern in education arises for abusing
partners. This di¤erential e¤ect of both partnersage in the incidence of abuse points
out an age cohort e¤ect in this phenomenon. The negative correlations betwen both
partnerseducation and abuse also hold when conditioning on the ages of the woman
and her partner.
Interestingly, there are strong di¤erences in the income distribution between house-
holds with abusing partners and households where abuse is absent. Households with
victimized women are substantially poorer, what appears consistent with Gelles(1974)
absolute resources theories by which diminished resources increase the risk of victim-
ization. There are not di¤erences in marital status between abused and non-abused
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women and in the size of the municipality of residence, and households with abusing
partners are just slightly larger than households where abuse is absent.
In Table 6, we report the incidence of IPV in accordance with employment statuses
of the woman and her partner, nding signicant di¤erences. Specically, abused
women seem to be less likely to work than non-abused women and, to a lesser extent,
abusive partners are less likely work than non-abusive partners. We could then think
that male partners are less likely to abuse if the woman is working; however, when
we consider the interaction between the statuses of the woman and her partner, this
does not seem to be the case. In fact, male partners are less likely to abuse when
the woman is working, only if the male partner is working too: when the woman is
working but her partner is not, the probability of abuse does increase.
In summary, the descriptive evidence indicates that sociodemographic characteris-
tics of women and their partners di¤er depending on the presence or the absence of
abuse. In particular, both partners tend to be older and much less educated, and live
in much poorer households. Interestingly, the domestic abuse is correlated with the
womans employment, her partners employment, and the interaction between employ-
ment statuses. Of course, these di¤erences just express marginal correlations, behind
which there can be di¤erences in observed and unobserved individual and demographic
characteristics, so we cannot necessarily infer the existence of causal e¤ects.
We have also consider complementary data to control for geographical e¤ects and
to exploit exogenous variation in order to undertake endogeneity problems in employ-
ment and income variables. In order to control for local e¤ects, we have also gathered
province-level information on per capita GDP (Source: Spanish National Accounts,
National Statistics) and population density (Source: Spanish Census, National Sta-
tistics). Regarding employment variables, we have constructed the employment and
unemployment rates by year, province, age group and gender (Source: Spanish Labor
Force Survey, National Statistics); for our purposes, we have calculated as the frac-
tion of the total population in that age-gender group that is employed or unemployed,
respectively. Regarding geographical information on income, we have computed the
fraction of poor households, dened as the ones whose income is one standard devi-
ation below the national average, by year, region and size of municipality (Source:
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Spanish Consumer Expenditure Surveys, National Statistics).
4 Empirical model
To study the e¤ect of female and male employment statuses on the probability of
female abuse, we use nonlinear discrete models. Let IPV i be the latent process that
guides intimate partner violence, characterized by the following underlying behavioral
model:
IPV i = 0 + 1fi + 2pi + 3 (fi  pi) +X0i + vi W0i + vi (1)
where Xi is a set of exogenous variables and fi and pi are dummy variables for women
and her partner employment, and (fi  pi) is the interaction between them. We observe
a binary variable, IPVi, which indicates whether women i experiences IPV,
IPVi = 1 (IPV

i > 0) = 1

0 + 1fi + 2pi + 3fi  pi
+X0i + vi  0

; (2)
where 1 denotes the indicator function. This model is known as dummy endogenous
variable model(Amemiya, 1985).
If vi j Xi; fi; pi  N (0; 1), model (2) becomes a standard probit model. If fi, pi
were continuous endogenous variables, provided we had a set of instruments Z for
them, such that the distribution of the fi, pi conditional on Xi;Zi were Normal, the
reduced form for IPVi would also be a probit model and, therefore, the parameters
in (2) could be easily estimated by means of a two-stage method. Nevertheless, the
presence of dummy endogenous regressors in a binary choice model makes the analy-
sis di¤er substantially from that in continuous variable models. More precisely, the
binary nature of the endogenous variables precludes the 2SLS approach, since their
distribution is not normal.
Given this, we account for the endogeneity problem by considering a multivariate
probit model. We must rst specify reduced form equations for female and male
employment:
fi = 1 (f

i > 0) = 1(Z
0
1i1 + "i1 > 0); (3)
pi = 1 (p

i > 0) = 1(Z
0
2i2 + "i2 > 0); (4)
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where (vi; "i1; "i2) are assumed to be jointly normally distributed with zero mean vector
and covariance matrix

 =
0@ 1 v"1 v"21 "1"2
1
1A : (5)
Notice that if v"1 = v"2 = "1"2 = 0 consistent estimators of the parameters could
be obtained by estimating each equation separately. Z1i and Z2i are sets of exoge-
nous variables, that include Xi. Although the model is identied by functional form
assumptions, exclusion restrictions by which there exist regressors in the employment
equations that do not directly a¤ect the domestic violence outcome improve identi-
cation of the parameters of the model.
Model parameters are jointly estimated byMaximumLikelihood. The log-likelihood
function (LF) of the model (omitting subscript i for the sake of simplicity) depends
on the trivariate standard normal distribution function, 3(:). It contains eight joint
probabilities corresponding to the eight possible combinations of the endogenous dum-
mies. The log LF is maximized with respect to ; 1; 2; v"1 ; v"2;; and "1"2 and takes
the following form:
L =
NX
i=1
log 3(i;i);
where
i = (Ki1W
0
i;Ki2Z
0
1i1; Ki2Z
0
2i2);
i = (Ki1Ki2v"1 ; Ki1Ki3v"2 ; Ki3Ki2"1"2);
with Ki1 = 2IPVi   1; Ki2 = 2fi   1; and Ki3 = 2pi   1:
Evaluating multivariate normal distribution functions by numerical approximation
is computationally cumbersome. Instead, we use simulation to approximate them, im-
plementing the most popular simulation method by Geweke, Hajivassiliou and Keane
(GHK). This method is based on the expression of the multivariate normal distribu-
tion as the product of sequentially conditioned univariate normal distributions, which
can be easily evaluated (see Borsch-Supan and Hajivassiliou, 1993).6
6The simulated maximum likelihood estimator is consistent as the number of draws and the number
of observations tend to innity. Increasing the draws increases accuracy, but at the cost of lengthening
run time. According to Hajivassiliou and Ruud (1994) ensuring that the number of random draws is
similar to the square root of the sample size ensures that the simulation bias is reduced to negligible.
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In our empirical model we have an additional potentially endogenous binary vari-
able, which is an indicator of being a poor household. Thus, we add to our specication
a reduced form model with additional exclusion restrictions for the probability of be-
ing a low income household, and estimate a tetravariate probit model that takes into
account the correlation between the error terms of the 4 di¤erent outcomes, domestic
violence, female employment, male employment, and low household income.
Finally, in non-linear discrete models the parameters of policy interest are typically
the marginal e¤ects of the variables evaluated at certain values of the explanatory
variables, for instance the mean. Given that our specication includes an interaction
between the employment indicators for both spouses, the marginal e¤ect of female
and male employment depends on the value of the partners employment status. For
instance, for the sample mean values of the covariatesX, the estimated e¤ect of female
employment on the probability of IPV when the male partner is employed is obtained
by considering the di¤erence
cPr(IPV = 1 j f = 1; p = 1;X) cPr(IPV = 1 j f = 0; p = 1;X)
= (b0 + b1 + b2 + b3 +X0b)  (b0 + b2 +X0b);
where b0, b1, b2, b3 and b are the multivariate model estimates and () denotes
the cumulative distribution function of the univariate standard normal distribution.
Equally, the e¤ect of female employment when the male partner is not employed is
given by
(b0 + b1 +X0b)  (b0 +X0b):
5 Results
In this section, we discuss our estimation results to assess the e¤ect on the probabilities
of physical and non-physical IPV of the employment statuses of both partners, house-
hold income, and other measures of socioeconomic status such as partnerseducation.
Our variables for employment status consist of each binary variable on whether the
corresponding partner is employed or not, and the interaction between them. Our
income variable consists on an indicator of low household income (when the respon-
dent asked that her household income was signicantly below the average). We have
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included sets of dummy variables on each partners completed education, as well as a
binary variable indicating whether the woman is more educated that her partner. We
control for additional socio-demographic variables: womans age, number of household
members, and a binary variable for large municipality of residence (above 200,000 in-
habitants). Moreover, we have included province-level variables on the logarithm of
per capita income and the population density.
The estimates for the probability of being victim of physical and non-physical abuse
are reported in Tables 7 and 8, respectively. In the rst column we report the univariate
probit estimates, which ignore the potential endogeneity of employment indicators
and household income. The multivariate probit estimates for the equations of the
corresponding type of IPV are reported in the second column, and the multivariate
probit estimates for the three auxiliary equations of each partners employment status
and low income are reported in the subsequent columns.7 The marginal e¤ects of the
employment status of each partner on each type of IPV based on the corresponding
multivariate probit estimations are reported in Table 9.
The univariate probit estimates for physical IPV show a signicantly positive co-
e¢ cient for woman employment and a negative and signicant coe¢ cient for the in-
teraction between woman and partner employment, while the coe¢ cient of partner
employment is small and non-signicant. These results indicate that, conditional on
income and other household and characteristics of both partners, in couples in which
the woman is employed but her partner is not, the risk of physical IPV is higher than
in couples in which neither partner is employed. Nonetheless, the sign of the e¤ect of
woman employment is reversed when her partner is also employed, that is, physical
abuse risk were reduced only when both partners are employed. Therefore, the mere
fact that the woman is employed would not make her less vulnerable to intimate-
partner violence, as such e¤ect is contingent to the employment status of his part-
ner. These results resemble previous ndings in MacMillan and Gartner (1999) and
Terrazas-Carrillo and McWhirter (2015), among others, by which womens employ-
ment substantially increases risk of abuse when their male partners are not employed.
Our multivariate probit models, which undertake the endogeneity problem of em-
7To obtain our estimates, we use the Stata third-party application mvprobit, written by Capellari
and Jenkins (2003).
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ployment statuses and low household income, consider, in addition to the IPV equa-
tion, three additional reduced form equation for these three variables.8 The specica-
tion of these equations is the usual in the literature.9 In addition to the joint normal
distributional assumption, we consider exclusion restrictions, so that we will include
additional variables in the auxiliary equations but not in the IPV equation. Speci-
cally, we use annual province-level female and male employment and unemployment
rates by age that are expected to be good predictors of the employment statuses of
each partnerand the percentage of low income households by year, region and size
of municipality that is expected to be a good predictor of the indicator of low in-
come household. As an exclusion restriction in the employment equations, we assume
that employment opportunities, measured by the province-level employment and un-
employment rates by gender an age, inuence the employment outcome, but have no
direct e¤ect on the incidence of domestic violence once the own employment status is
accounted for. Likewise, we assume that the fraction of low income households at the
local level a¤ect the household poverty risk, but do not have a direct e¤ect on IPV.
Unlike the univariate probit, multivariate estimates for physical IPV show that
the estimated coe¢ cient of partner status is signicantly negative, whereas female
employment status does not increase the risk of physical violence. In fact, the e¤ect
of female employment depends critically on the employment status of her partner.
Whereas female employment does not reduce the risk of IPV when her partner is not
employed, it does when her partner is employed too. Thus, according to these results,
partner employment status plays a crucial role: women cohabiting with an employed
man face signicantly lower risk of experiencing physical abuse than women whose
partner is not employed, which is even lower when the woman is employed too.
To compute the marginal e¤ects of employment on physical IPV (rst column of
Table 9) we have taken as reference the mean values of the variables for 2006. The
risk of violence is signicantly lower in households where the male partner is employed,
8Notice that in this case the potential endogeneity of income arises, not only because of the obvious
simultaneity bias, but because of potential measurement error too.
9The specication used for the corresponding binary employment equations for each partner re-
semble the baseline specications for labor market participation that have been widely used in the
empirical labor literature (see for instance Mroz, 1987). One of the major di¤erences between labor
force participation specications for women and men is that in the case of women, a measure of
household income (excluding the womans labor income) is usually included among the covariates.
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amounting to 2.9 and 1.9 percentage points less depending on whether the woman is
employed or not. Considering female employment, we have already seen that it only
has a signicantly lowering e¤ect on the risk of physical violence provided that her
partner is employed. In this case, the risk of violence is 2.5 percentage points lower.
To weigh the importance of these gures, it must be recalled that the sample rate of
physical IPV in 2006 amounted to 3.9%.
To better understand the underlying causes of the di¤erences between the univari-
ate and the multivariate estimates, it is useful to look at the estimated correlation
coe¢ cients among the error terms in the four equations, reported at the end of Tables
7 and 8 for physical and non-physical violence, respectively. They point out a posi-
tive endogeneity bias in the estimated coe¢ cients of the employment statuses of the
woman and of her partner. This suggests that unobserved factors that increase the
risk of IPV are positively correlated with the employment statuses of each of them. We
could think on several potential reasons behind this positive bias, such as that working
women are more likely to report physical abuse than non-working women (as pointed
out in the literature), or certain unobserved characteristics of each partner that make
abuse more likely (such as unobserved family background) or that make them more
likely to be employed. Last three columns in Tables 7 and 8 present the estimated
coe¢ cients for the two employment and the low income equations, that resemble usual
specications. It is worth noticing that the results for these equations, both for physi-
cal and non-physical abuse, are very similar and that the set of instruments used have
a highly signicant e¤ect in explaining the probability of female employment, male
employment and the probability of living in a low income household.
Our ndings challenge absolute resource theories by which it is availability of re-
sources, rather than who is the breadwinner, what matters for violence. Besides, the
results are not fully supportive of relative resource theories either, by which, other
things equal, womans employment should improve her bargaining position, thus re-
ducing the risk of violence, particularly when her partners position is weaker (as
when he is not employed). The fact that it is male employment what matters most
for reducing domestic violence suggests that the signicance of male employment sta-
tus goes beyond its economic role, emphasizing its symbolic role in strengthening the
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masculinity in the relationship among partners.
These results are consistent with the interpretation that di¤erent family patterns,
particularly equal vs traditional families, which entail symmetry or asymmetry in labor
market participation, are associated with di¤erent risk of abuse. Anderson (1997) re-
marked that status incompatibilities among partners are di¤erentially associated with
IPV. Expectations about the relative statuses of male and female partners are based
on what is normative within society, and deviations from the norm result in dissatis-
faction for the male partner (Horning and McCulloch, 1981). As an extreme case, a
situation where the male partner is not employed challenges the cultural depiction of
the male partner as breadwinner, what might trigger the risk of violence.
The di¤erential results between the univariate and the multivariate estimated e¤ect
of employment estimates are qualitatively similar for physical an non physical IPV. In
this latter case, even though employment e¤ects are not individually signicant, they
remain jointly signicant. The marginal e¤ects of employment statuses of each partner
on the risk of non-physical IPV (reported in the second column of Table 9) are negative
though only signicant when the other partner is employed too. Interestingly, the e¤ect
of female employment looks substantially higher than the e¤ect of male employment.
Specically, the risk of non-physical violence is 4.9 percentage points lower when the
woman is employed, provided that her partner is employed too, whereas such risk is
2.7 percentage points lower when the male partner is employed, provided that the
woman is employed too. These e¤ects are quantitatively sizeable, considering that the
sample rate of non-physical IPV in 2006 was 8.2%.
As to the e¤ect of income, the other potentially endogenous variable in our model,
the positive e¤ect of living in a poor household on both physical and non-physical
abuse that is found in the univariate estimations, disappears and becomes statistically
non-signicant once we account for the endogeneity problem. As with the employment
variables, we also nd that ignoring the endogeneity problem induces a positive bias,
which is validated by the sign and signicance of the correlation coe¢ cient between
the unobservables a¤ecting the probability of experiencing abuse and the equation of
low household income. It is worth noting that the correlation coe¢ cient between the
IPV and the low income equations are signicantly positive for both types of abuse,
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suggesting that the unobservables that increase the risk of both types of IPV are
positively associated with the unobservables that increase the risk of poverty.
Regarding the e¤ect of the other variables of interest, we nd that the risk of expe-
riencing non-physical abuse increases with womans age, but the e¤ect of womans age
on physical abuse appears too be weaker. Interestingly, the education of the potential
abuser seems to matter more than the education of the potential victim: we nd that
women whose partners are more educated have lower risk of any type of IPV, while
the e¤ect of womans education seems less relevant for physical abuse. We nd that
di¤erences in education among partners, that capture to some extent socioeconomic
disparities among partners, have only a signicant e¤ect for non-physical abuse. In
particular, if the woman has a higher level of education that her partner, the risk of
non-physical abuse increases, while there is not a signicant e¤ect on physical abuse.
Finally, household size has a signicantly positive e¤ect on both types of IPV. This
variable provides an imperfect measure of children, who may be seen as a marriage-
specic capital, which enhance the value of the relationship and may decrease the
chance that the relationship ends (Becker, Landes and Michael, 1977). The theoret-
ical e¤ect of children in the risk of abuse is ambiguous, depending on their relative
value to each partner and how it a¤ects the marginal utility for violence of the male
partner. The positive e¤ect suggests two channels by which the risk of violence would
rise. First, children increased the child care responsabilities for the woman, lowering
her reservation utility level; second, children increased the stress within the household,
contributing to rise the risk of violence.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we have addressed the e¤ect of employment statuses of the woman and
her partner on the risk of intimate-partner violence (IPV), using cross-sectional data
on Spanish women from the 1999, 2002 and 2006 VAW surveys. We have explicitly
considered the separate e¤ects of the employment status of each partner, as well as
the interaction between them. We have analyzed separately physical and non-physical
IPV. Our measures of employment status are two binary indicators that capture the
employment status of each partner. Additionally, we have conditioned in income, using
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a binary variable on whether household income is substantially below average, and a
set of sociodemographic characteristics, including womans age, the levels of education
of each partner, and characteristics of the location of residence and the household.
Our results may be confronted to di¤erent theories about IPV that generate di¤erent
predictions about the e¤ect of the employment status of each partner.
Our estimation results conrm the need of accounting for endogeneity of employ-
ment statuses and income, both for physical and non-physical abuse. Particularly, the
employment status of the partner plays a leading role in the risk of physical abuse.
Women whose partner is employed are much less likely to experience physical abuse
than women cohabiting with non-working partners; this e¤ect is much stronger when
the women is employed too. Quantitatively, the estimated marginal e¤ects of the em-
ployment statuses of both partners on both types of IPV are sizeable, by which the
risk of abuse is less than half among couples in which both partners are employed
with respect to couples in which only the male partner works, and much lower with
respect to couples in which the male partner does not work. These results seem to
be in accordance with the instrumental use of violence by abusing partners predicted
by backlash theories, by which violence is exerted when the male partner faces a rela-
tive improvement in the womans position within the household in order to assert his
position within the household.
Our results favor the interpretation that di¤erent family patterns, particularly
equal vs traditional families, which entail symmetry or asymmetry in labor market
participation, are associated with di¤erent risk of abuse (Anderson, 1997). A major
nding is that the risk of physical violence is the lowest for those balanced couples
in which both partners are employed. Laws and services devised to empower women
and encourage men to value an equal partner are likely to be important steps towards
abuse reduction (Coleman and Strauss, 1986). Additionally, as long as more children
grow up in nontraditional households with working mothers (Nock, 2001), this will
induce an intergenerational transmission of nontraditional gender patterns (Pollak,
2004; Bowlus and Seitz, 2006).
Besides, the risk of violence is strongly increased in those couples where the male
partner is not employed, so that his traditional role as main breadwinner is challenged.
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Programs designed to increase womens independence should give priority to such
vulnerable relationships. Long run policies towards womens economic independence
and gender equality must be complemented with short run interventions to increase
female empowerment within the household, particularly reinforcing law and deterrence
mechanisms and increasing the resources for shelters and help services for battered
women. Also, promoting early intervention to target children who witness violence or
experience abuse.
Our study is limited by the characteristics of the data. In particular, our data lacks
of family background information on violence during partnerschildhood. Availability
of such information would help us to understand the forces driving female risk of
victimization. In addition, it would shed light on the intergenerational e¤ects of family
patterns on the transmission of abuse in the long run, given the evidence that domestic
violence as a child dramatically increases the odds that men become abusers (Bowlus
and Seitz, 2006). Also, it would allow to gauge the extent of assortative mating on
the basis of violence in the partnersfamilies of origin (Pollak, 2004).
In addition, the use of cross-sectional data prevents us to understand the dynamics
of employment and violence, for which longitudinal data would be needed. In partic-
ular, we could exploit past employment statuses to ascertain the long run and short
run e¤ects of employment statuses, and the persistence e¤ects of employment on the
risk of abuse (see Tauchen and Witte, 1995).
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Table 1
Indicators of IPV violence in Spain
Homicides committed
by current or former partner Users of public Number of
Year All Cohabiting Without Number of help service to emergency
indictment Indictments abused women phone calls
1999 54
2000 63
2001 50
2002 54 47; 165
2003 71 55 56; 484
2004 72 48 67; 171
2005 57 36 72; 098 2; 374
2006 69 45 36 80; 751 5; 661
2007 71 47 40 126; 293 8; 787 15; 715
2008 76 40 45 142; 125 12; 274 74; 951
2009 56 35 33 135; 540 13; 696 68; 541
2010 73 46 41 134; 105 8; 830 67; 696
2011 61 39 40 134; 002 9; 939 70; 679
2012 52 37 38 128; 477 9; 405 55; 810
2013 54 29 30 124; 893 10; 426 58; 268
2014 54 35 30 126; 742 10; 502 68; 612
Source: Spanish Monitoring Centre on Violence Against Women, Ministry of Justice and
Ministry of the Interior.
Until 2006, it only computed direct complaints to the police forces, but not in court.
Table 2
Categories of serious abuse in the Spanish VAW surveys
Behavior Physical Non-Physical
Abuse Abuse
Stopped from seeing relatives, friends and neighbors 
Prevented from fair share of household money 
Insulted or threatened you 
Prevented from deciding by yourself 
Forced to have sexual intercourse 
Deprived of your necessities 
Scared you sometimes 
Pushed you or hit you 
Scorned about your capacity 
Criticized for the things you do 
Despised for your beliefs 
Disregarded for your work 
Disrespected in front of your children 
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Table 3
Intimate Partner Violence (IPV) by year and type
IPV Type
Obs. Any Physical Non-Phys.
1999 9379 13:40 6:42 10:35
2002 9934 12:39 5:18 9:92
2006 13097 9:96 3:92 8:20
All 32410 11:70 5:03 9:35
Test for independence (22) 69:1 71:8 35:3
Source: Own calculations from Spanish VAW Surveys, 1999, 2002, 2006:
Table 4
Intimate Partner Violence (IPV) by region
IPV Type
Obs. Any Physical Non-Phys.
Andalucia 5345 12:95 5:97 10:10
Aragon 1355 8:78 3:03 7:38
Asturias 958 11:27 3:86 9:60
Baleares 886 10:50 4:51 8:24
Canarias 1174 12:44 5:79 9:63
Cantabria 823 9:48 3:89 7:53
Castilla-La Mancha 1299 14:40 6:47 11:39
Castilla y León 1653 12:70 6:05 9:38
Cataluña 3841 10:34 4:17 8:49
Comunitat Valenciana 2609 11:73 4:98 9:08
Extremadura 847 13:93 6:61 10:39
Galicia 2154 11:23 4:83 9:24
Madrid 4868 11:89 4:87 9:98
Murcia 948 12:03 4:85 9:81
Navarra 843 9:96 3:91 7:59
Euskadi 1516 10:95 4:88 8:64
La Rioja 463 9:50 4:10 7:99
Ceuta & Melilla 828 13:29 6:16 10:39
Test for independence (217) 55:1 53:6 34:1
Source: Own calculations from Spanish VAW Surveys, 1999, 2002, 2006.
26
Table 5
Summary statistics for partners and household characteristics by IPV status
No IPV Type
Abuse Any Physical Non-Phys.
Woman age
18-29 years 0:09 (0:29) 0:07x (0:25) 0:07x (0:25) 0:07x (0:25)
30-49 years 0:59 (0:49) 0:53x (0:50) 0:47x (0:50) 0:54x (0:50)
50-64 years 0:32 (0:46) 0:40x (0:49) 0:46x (0:50) 0:39x (0:49)
Woman education
Primary or less 0:59 (0:49) 0:71x (0:44) 0:80x (0:40) 0:73x (0:44)
Secondary 0:21 (0:41) 0:16x (0:36) 0:11x (0:32) 0:15x (0:35)
College 0:20 (0:40) 0:13x (0:34) 0:09x (0:28) 0:12x (0:32)
Partner age
18-29 years 0:05 (0:21) 0:03x (0:17) 0:03x (0:16) 0:03x (0:17)
30-49 years 0:56 (0:50) 0:48x (0:50) 0:43x (0:50) 0:48x (0:50)
50-64 years 0:32 (0:47) 0:39x (0:49) 0:42x (0:49) 0:39x (0:49)
above 65 years 0:07 (0:26) 0:10x (0:30) 0:12x (0:32) 0:10x (0:30)
Partner education
Primary or less 0:59 (0:49) 0:71x (0:45) 0:77x (0:42) 0:70x (0:46)
Secondary 0:21 (0:41) 0:15x (0:36) 0:14x (0:34) 0:16x (0:37)
College 0:19 (0:39) 0:13x (0:33) 0:09x (0:29) 0:14x (0:35)
Household size 3:55 (1:21) 3:69x (1:34) 3:69x (1:32) 3:69x (1:34)
Married (Y/n) 0:95 (0:22) 0:95 (0:22) 0:95 (0:21) 0:94 (0:23)
Household income
Below average 0:11 (0:31) 0:19x (0:39) 0:23x (0:42) 0:19x (0:39)
Average 0:27 (0:45) 0:30x (0:46) 0:30y (0:46) 0:29y (0:46)
Above average 0:62 (0:49) 0:51x (0:50) 0:47x (0:50) 0:52x (0:50)
Large municipality 0:24 (0:42) 0:24 (0:43) 0:23 (0:42) 0:25 (0:43)
Source: Own calculations from Spanish VAW Surveys, 1999, 2002, 2006.
Means and standard deviations (between parentheses).
,y,xdenote mean di¤erence with respect to not abused signicant at the 10, 5 and 1 percent, respectively.
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Table 6
Summary statistics for partnersemployment and IPV status
No IPV Type
Abuse Any Physical Non-Phys.
Woman empl. 0:42 (0:49) 0:34x (0:47) 0:31x (0:46) 0:35x (0:48)
Partner empl. 0:84 (0:37) 0:78x (0:42) 0:74x (0:44) 0:78x (0:41)
Both employed 0:39 (0:49) 0:30x (0:46) 0:26x (0:44) 0:31x (0:46)
Woman not empl., 0:45 (0:50) 0:48x (0:50) 0:48x (0:50) 0:47y (0:50)
Partner empl
Woman empl. 0:03 (0:17) 0:04x (0:20) 0:05x (0:21) 0:04x (0:20)
Partner not empl.
Both not empl. 0:13 (0:33) 0:18x (0:39) 0:21x (0:41) 0:18x (0:38)
Source: Own calculations from Spanish VAW Surveys, 1999, 2002, 2006.
Means and standard deviations (between parentheses).
,y,xdenote mean di¤erence with respect to not abused signicant at the 10, 5 and 1 percent, respectively.
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Table 7
Estimates for risk of Physical IPV
Univariate Tetravariate
Ipv Ipv Woman Partner Low
Physical Physical empl. empl. income
Woman employed 0:1359y  0:1267
(0:0662) (0:1826)
Partner employed  0:0058  0:1585y
(0:0375) (0:0802)
Woman empl  Partner empl.  0:1817y  0:1818y
(0:0715) (0:0729)
Household size 0:0472x 0:0416x  0:0761x 0:0179y  0:0263x
(0:0097) (0:0108) (0:0066) (0:0085) (0:0084)
Woman Age 30-49 0:0147  0:0094 0:0194
(0:0482) (0:0487) (0:0386)
Woman Age 50-64 0:1899x 0:0960  0:0641
(0:0513) (0:0639) (0:0611)
Woman: Secondary  0:1309x  0:1002 0:3804x  0:3373x
(0:0445) (0:0515) (0:0221) (0:0362)
Woman: College  0:1358y  0:0511 0:9975x  0:5360x
(0:0569) (0:0811) (0:0265) (0:0501)
Partner: Secondary  0:1429x  0:1542x 0:0405 0:1983x  0:4602x
(0:0381) (0:0397) (0:0225) (0:0289) (0:0337)
Partner: College  0:2435x  0:2607x 0:0252 0:4936x  0:7294x
(0:0517) (0:0537) (0:0268) (0:0316) (0:0458)
ln(province GDP per capita)  0:0815  0:0818  0:1051y  0:0453  0:2459x
(0:0542) (0:0607) (0:0491) (0:0531) (0:0596)
prov. population density 0:0145 0:0104  0:0195 0:0254 0:0059
(0:0167) (0:0168) (0:0116) (0:0152) (0:0141)
Woman more educated 0:0258 0:0214
(0:0451) (0:0447)
Low income hhold 0:2566x  0:0477  0:3871x
(0:0339) (0:1445) (0:1230)
Large municipality 0:0428 0:0383
(0:0292) (0:0289)
Source: Own calculations from Spanish VAW Surveys, 1999, 2002, 2006.
Standard errors in parentheses
,y, x denote signicance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent, respectively.
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Table 7 (cont.)
Estimates for risk of Physical IPV
Univariate Tetravariate
Ipv Ipv Woman Partner Low
Physical Physical empl. empl. income
Y3  0:0897x  0:0932x
(0:0248) (0:0323)
RNorMed  0:0945x  0:1078x
(0:0198) (0:0260)
Partner Age 30-49  0:1765x  0:1193  0:1456y
(0:0476) (0:0747) (0:0584)
Partner Age 50-64  0:2322x  0:3088x  0:0701
(0:0536) (0:0799) (0:0665)
Partner Age 65+  0:3044x  0:5474x  0:0927
(0:0890) (0:1046) (0:0969)
Fem. Emp. rate 1:4676x 1:0019x  0:4213x
(0:1148) (0:1092) (0:1114)
Fem. Unem. rate  0:4568 1:0429x 0:1227
(0:2344) (0:3086) (0:2755)
Male Emp. rate 0:3960x 2:2619x  1:0646x
(0:0903) (0:0867) (0:0941)
Male Unem. rate. 0:1810 1:4885x  0:0692
(0:3109) (0:4127) (0:3888)
% Low income 1:6177x
(0:1788)
Wald tests of joint signicance (p value)
Employment ind. 0:0316y 0:0002x
Woman Age 0:0000x 0:0403y 0:0532
Woman Educ. 0:0073x 0:1037 0:0000x 0:0000x
Partner Age 0:0003x 0:0000x 0:0079x
Partner Educ. 0:0000x 0:0000x 0:1963 0:0000x 0:0000x
Z Em + Unem. 0:0000x 0:0000x 0:0000x
Cross-equations correlation coe¢ cients
Ipv Physical 0:1652 0:0736 0:1417
(0:0968) (0:0391) (0:0764)
Woman empl. 0:0340 0:0581
(0:0176) (0:0657)
Partner empl.  0:3559x
(0:0142)
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Table 8
Estimates for risk of Non-Physical IPV
Univariate Tetravariate
Ipv Ipv Woman Partner Low
Non-Phys Non-Phys empl. empl. income
Woman employed 0:0817  0:1848
(0:0574) (0:1588)
Partner employed  0:0276  0:1252
(0:0322) (0:0773)
Woman empl  Partner empl.  0:1164  0:0930
(0:0612) (0:0623)
Hhold size 0:0453x 0:0362x  0:0761x 0:0178y  0:0265x
(0:0080) (0:0090) (0:0066) (0:0085) (0:0084)
Woman Age 30-49 0:0877y 0:0681 0:0209
(0:0389) (0:0396) (0:0386)
Woman Age 50-64 0:1676x 0:1156y  0:0595
(0:0421) (0:0539) (0:0611)
Woman: Secondary  0:1250x  0:1019y 0:3778x  0:3342x
(0:0342) (0:0414) (0:0221) (0:0361)
Woman: College  0:1945x  0:1192 0:9943x  0:5355x
(0:0432) (0:0679) (0:0266) (0:0501)
Partner: Secondary  0:0971x  0:1249x 0:0366 0:1978x  0:4629x
(0:0301) (0:0320) (0:0224) (0:0289) (0:0338)
Partner: College  0:0562  0:0977y 0:0201 0:4942x  0:7275x
(0:0392) (0:0417) (0:0267) (0:0316) (0:0457)
ln(province GDP per capita) 0:0143  0:0111  0:1095y  0:0455  0:2422x
(0:0443) (0:0516) (0:0490) (0:0532) (0:0595)
prov. population density 0:0151 0:0120  0:0190 0:0256 0:0045
(0:0140) (0:0141) (0:0115) (0:0152) (0:0142)
Woman more educated 0:1342x 0:1229x
(0:0355) (0:0352)
Low income hhold 0:2190x  0:2037  0:4410x
(0:0298) (0:1332) (0:1194)
Large municipality 0:0781x 0:0731x
(0:0235) (0:0232)
Source: Own calculations from Spanish VAW Surveys, 1999, 2002, 2006.
Standard errors in parentheses
,y, x denote signicance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent, respectively.
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Table 8 (cont.)
Estimates for risk of Non-Physical IPV
Univariate Tetravariate
Ipv Ipv Woman Partner Low
Non-Phys. Non-Phys. empl. empl. income
Y3  0:0770x  0:0725x
(0:0263) (0:0259)
RNorMed  0:0827x  0:0845x
(0:0210) (0:0211)
Partner Age 30-49  0:1735x  0:1166  0:1434y
(0:0474) (0:0747) (0:0583)
Partner Age 50-64  0:2344x  0:3062x  0:0703
(0:0536) (0:0799) (0:0663)
Partner Age 65+  0:3135x  0:5477x  0:1007
(0:0890) (0:1046) (0:0966)
Fem. Emp. rate 1:4700x 1:0046x  0:4346x
(0:1147) (0:1092) (0:1111)
Fem. Unem. rate  0:4544 1:0497x 0:1439
(0:2342) (0:3088) (0:2747)
Male Emp. rate 0:3670x 2:2572x  1:0711x
(0:0903) (0:0867) (0:0937)
Male Unem. rate. 0:1848 1:4956x  0:0760
(0:3108) (0:4130) (0:3876)
% Low income 1:6160x
(0:1782)
Wald tests of joint signicance (p value)
Employment ind. 0:0449 0:0030x
Woman Age 0:0001x 0:0991 0:0002x
Woman Educ. 0:0000x 0:0484y 0:0000x 0:0000x
Partner Age 0:0002x 0:0000x 0:0002x
Partner Educ. 0:0055x 0:0005x 0:2636 0:0000x 0:0000x
Z Em + Unem. 0:0000x 0:0000x 0:0000x
Cross-equations correlation coe¢ cients
Ipv Non-Phys. 0:1564 0:0108 0:2193x
(0:0843) (0:0366) (0:0709)
Woman empl. 0:0288 0:0879
(0:0175) (0:0641)
Partner empl.  0:3566x
(0:0142)
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Table 9
Estimated marginal e¤ects of woman and partner employment on IPV
E¤ect of woman employment
Physical Non-Physical
Partner not employed  0:0157  0:0439
(0:0221) (0:0270)
Partner employed  0:0254  0:0491y
(0:0140) (0:0212)
E¤ect of partner employment
Physical Non-Physical
Woman not employed  0:0191  0:0219
(0:0102) (0:0152)
Woman employed  0:0289y  0:0272
(0:0131) (0:0159)
Source: Own calculations from Spanish VAW Surveys, 1999, 2002, 2006.
Marginal e¤ects evaluated for 2006, using the sample mean values at that year.
Standard errors, computed using the Delta method, in parentheses
,y, xdenote signicance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent, respectively.
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